IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TRUTH

By PARVUS

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN. [And then from German]

How I became a German Social Democrat.

At the beginning of the war, the Paris-based newspaper "Nasche Slovo" asked me whether I presented myself as a Russian or a German Social Democrat. However, I had already answered this question before it was even posed to me. In my speech delivered in Sofia, I had already explained that I presented myself not as a Russian, but as a German Social Democrat. My position was thus clear. For the casual reader, however, it must seem quite strange that such a question—whether Russian or German—was even possible

However, there were also other cases of Russian political emigrants acquiring foreign citizenship. To avoid going too far afield, it suffices, for example, to point to P. B. Axelrod, who has long been a citizen of Switzerland. However, P. B. Axelrod acquired Swiss citizenship not for political reasons, but for commercial or family reasons. A. Herzen[1] had himself admitted to the Swiss Confederation out of conviction.

He had lost confidence in Russia's political development. I cannot say the same for myself. On the contrary, even during the years of political stagnation, I firmly believed in the coming Russian Revolution, so that when Leo Deutsch returned from Siberia, he considered me an incorrigible optimist.

My conversion to German Social Democracy was the result of my socialist activity. To put this question to rest once and for all, I will briefly describe how it came about. I was born in Russia. I spent the best years of my childhood in the Kuban region, the years of my youth in Odessa. I dreamed under the starry sky of Ukraine, listened to the waves on the shores of the Black Sea,-and in my memories, the songs of Ukraine curl up with the fairy tales and stories of the master craftsmen who came to my father every summer from the provinces of

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[1]Famous Russian socialist publicist (1812-1870). He became particularly well-known in Europe for his work "From Other Shores," in which he vehemently criticized Western European civilization. Of immense influence in Russia, especially in the early years of its publication, was the journal Kolokol ("The Bell") which he edited in London from 1857 to 1867 and later in Geneva.

Central Russia. Shevchenko[2] was the first to teach me the idea of class struggle. I was enthusiastic about a "Haidamakis,"[3] Mikhailovsky,[4] Shchedrin,[5] and Uspensky[6] gave a decisive direction to my further intellectual development. The first book I read on political economy was that of John Stuart Mill with the annotations of Chernyshevsky.

It was during the time of the collapse of Narodnaya Volya,[7] when I joined the revolutionary movement. We didn't know then whether to resort to terror or propaganda among the workers. Together with Shargorodsky, who was later exiled to the Yakut region, I decided to learn a trade in order to come into closer contact with the workers. For about a year, we wandered through locksmith and blacksmith workshops. Our interaction with the workers made us recognize even more clearly the need for a definite and clear program. Consequently, when the opportunity arose in 1886 to travel to Switzerland, I seized it, hoping that my political doubts would be resolved abroad and, above all, that I would be able to equip myself with workers' literature.

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[2]Ukrainian national and freedom poet (1814-1861). Son of a serf, whose ordeal through Russian prisons became a symbol of the suffering of an entire people

[3]This was the name given to those peasants, Cossacks, and petty bourgeois who, in the 18th century, rebelled against the prevailing social and political regime, and especially against Polish rule in the Little Russian territories east of the Dnieper, repeatedly instigating bloody uprisings in the country. The movement was largely supported by Russian clergy, particularly monks, who provided weapons and provisions. After 1768, the year of the last major uprising, the movement gradually subsided and disappeared completely after the Second Partition of Poland, which brought the territory in question to Russia.

[4]A brilliant journalist, sociologist, and critic (1842–1904) who exerted a great influence on Russian intellectuals: He was close to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party but also worked for the legal Russian press

[5]One of the greatest Russian satirists and chroniclers of manners (1826-1889). Himself a Russian civil servant who even rose to the rank of governor, he knew the bureaucracy inside and out and brandished the quagmire of bureaucracy and provincial life with caustic sharpness. His due ridicule was also directed at the self-styled liberals.

[6]) One of the most popular and beloved writers (1840 to 1902). He depicted the life, feelings, and thoughts of the "little people" with the utmost truthfulness.

[7]A party founded in 1879 ("People's Will"), which, unlike the Land and Liberty party from which it emerged, prioritized the political struggle to achieve a socialist world order and justified terror for Russia as a necessary means of struggle, citing the extraordinary cruelty of the government and the particular bleakness of Russian reality. When it became known that prominent members of the party were creatures of the police department, the party's disintegration became inevitable. Various attempts at revival failed. The party's legacy was later taken over by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, with a partially differing program, while at the same time the social-democratic movement began in Russia.

In Zurich, I scoured everything the Russian illegal press had produced since Alexander Herzen, but for the workers, apart from the book "Chitraya Mechanika" (Khitraya Mechanica)[8] and (I found nothing in Dickstein's pamphlet.[9] At the same time, I was swept up in the full whirlwind of party disputes. This was the time of the very beginnings of Russian Social Democracy. The focus of the discussion was Plekhanov's "Our Disagreements." A program that prioritized the class struggle of the proletariat resonated with my own thinking. I declared myself a Social Democrat and participated in the founding of the "Union of Russian Social Democracy." However, this only increased the number of open questions for me. With regard to Russia, I was troubled by the fact that Plekhanov's program left no room for the peasantry; for Russia, however one looks at it, is primarily a peasantry. Then the global questions pressed forward: How could the workers come to power, and how should the economic transformation of socialism proceed?

I returned to Russia, but the idea that had been awakened in me would not rest. People listened to me willingly when I spoke of Social Democracy, but I was tormented by the fact that I was unable to give the workers an answer that would satisfy even myself. On the contrary, the more I immersed myself in the questions of social revolution, the more new questions pressed upon me.

When I returned abroad in 1887, I resolved to devote myself thoroughly to the study of the workers' movement, the development of the capitalist world order, and the political history of Western Europe. My scholarly work in this direction led me to prioritize the tasks of socialism in Europe and to relegate the struggle for parliamentarism in Russia to the background. From Russia I brought with me the determined struggle against state power, which there manifested itself only in its authoritarian form, and the idea of serving the people. In Europe I perceived the working masses who were in reality waging their class struggle. This was no longer an abstraction, but pulsating life. In order to fully absorb it, one had to become a part of it oneself. This also happened to me.

When I became a socialist, I could not possibly remain a detached spectator of the struggle of the European proletariat unfolding before my eyes. Without even realizing it, I was drawn into the movement and became absorbed into it body and soul. Russian, German, the

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[8]"The Artful Mechanism". A propaganda pamphlet written in an exceedingly felicitous popular style, which is still circulated with enthusiasm by the Socialist Revolutionaries.

[9]("Who lives from what"). A great agitation biochure.

struggle of the proletariat remains always one and the same and knows neither national nor denominational differences. In 1891, I wrote to Wilhelm Liebknecht, pointing out the various difficulties the police were causing me, as a foreigner, in my party activities, and expressing my opinion that these difficulties could best be avoided by registering with one of the German fatherlands: "I am looking for a fatherland, where can I find one for cheap?"

If I have ever been disloyal to my Russian homeland, it was at that time that it happened, and it was also disloyalty to the class from which I came, the bourgeoisie. It was then that the seeds of disintegration between me and the Russian intelligentsia were sown. In those years, G. V. Plekhanov met me and asked, "Would you write about Belinsky?"[10] But at that time I was occupied with the questions of workers' legislation, state monopolies, and so on. So I pointed out to him how disproportionate his suggestion was to what interested me at the time. "What a pity," he replied. "Do you remember? Your native literature is the most honorable."

The Russian literary reflection of the German philosophy of the 1840s, which in turn was the ideological reflection of the French Revolution, English industry, and the social upheaval taking place in Germany, naturally interested me less than the tremendous activity of the German proletariat, which was preparing the socialist future for the world.

German Social Democracy became my new fatherland. Over the course of more than a quarter of a century, all my intellectual activity, my dreams and hopes, were connected and intertwined with the work of German Social-Democracy; I was enthusiastic about it, and I experienced disappointments with it. There were disputes and disagreements between us, I was right and I was wrong, I was angry and I was indignant, I criticized, I continue to criticize, only one thing I cannot do: place myself outside of Social Democracy.

When I criticized the Russian socialist intelligentsia, I often reproached them for the lack of this living connection with the workers' movement. However cleverly the Russian intellectuals might write about Social Democracy, it all sounded like book wisdom; the working masses were losing their vitality and were turning into statistical figures; socialism became the realization of an abstract principle for which the intelligentsia was prepared to

[10] A classic of Russian literary criticism. (1810-1848).

sacrifice the whole world, including the working class. For the mass of the Russian intelligentsia, socialism itself was in reality only a means to revolution.

Long before 1906, and before the years that followed, which weighed on everyone like a nightmare, I foresaw and predicted the fall of the Russian intelligentsia from workers' socialism. I remained interested in the events in Russia, but only from the standpoint of German Social Democracy, that is, I considered them from the standpoint of their influence on the political development of Western Europe and on bringing social revolution closer.

In 1892, I published a series of essays on the famine, in which I predicted the accelerated development of industry and the revolutionary movement in Russia. In 1896, I was a member of the Russian delegation at the International Socialist Congress in London. In 1899, I went to Russia with my friend Karl Lehmann to study the famine there, and traveled by car with a passport in the name of the Czech August Pen through the governorates of Kazan, Vyatka, Uya, Samara, and Simbirsk. When Lenin, Martov, and Potresov visited me in Munich and presented their plan for the journal "Iskra," I persuaded them to settle in Munich and publish their journal there. My aim was to enrich the intellectual editorial staff by bringing them into closer contact with the mass workers' movement of German Social Democracy. The last issues of "Iskra" concluded with my essays in which I endeavored to demonstrate that the intelligentsia in the workers' movement in Russia had played out its role and, by teaching Russian workers to think politically and to organize themselves, had also fulfilled its mission; that the mass workers' movement, which had broken out in Russia, now had to develop independently and shed the tutelage of the intelligentsia.

My essays on the Russo-Japanese War appeared in the same "Iskra" under the title: "War and Revolution." I predicted the destruction of the Tsarist army and called for revolutionary action in order to use the war as a favorable opportunity to overthrow the autocracy. Among other things, I was the first to point out the possibility and necessity of provoking a mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet. My views were received with enthusiasm. For at that time, Russia did not yet possess that self-assured bourgeois liberalism which, in the present war, has managed to extend its influence even to the most extreme representatives of socialism in Russia. When the 1905 Revolution reached its climax, I went to Russia. My German friends, A. Bebel, Fr. Mehring, and others, held me back, pointing to the importance of my scholarly work in the field of socialism. I replied that it seemed to me more important to throw a movement into the balance than a book.

My tactics during the 1905 revolution in Russia were predetermined by the following starting point: to pave the way for the revolutionary proletariat in Russia in order to strengthen the revolutionary energy of the proletariat in the West. Although I knew very well that socialism could not yet be realized in Russia at that time, it was clear to me that a victorious revolution based on the working masses had to surrender power to the proletariat, and I demanded that the proletariat use this power in the interest of the implementation of a workers' democracy. "If the only thing to be said was to create a bourgeois parliamentarism in Russia, I told my Russian friends, I would calmly remain in Germany, where this parliamentarism already has a rather long history."

My statement on the World War.

"Capitalism, whose historical development is characterized by the extermination of entire classes of people, has now, through the clash of competitive forces in the economic, political, and military spheres, which it had cultivated in individual countries, accompanied by a decay of social order, corruption, and depravity, set Europe ablaze. With the immense means of the weapons technology and military organizations it created, it destroyed the industry of Europe, on which science and civilized nations had worked for generations; it destroyed the wealth and formal civilization to which it had always appealed as the ultimate and decisive justification for the exploitation of the people it had driven to such extremes, and the property order whose inviolability it had preached and sought to defend with all means of state power." This is how I characterized the World War in October 1914. Elsewhere, I expressed myself regarding nationalism as follows:

"One is, incidentally, completely mistaken about the nature of the national enthusiasm that has now gripped Europe. It is not the beginning of a new nationalist era of modern civilization; rather, it is the conclusion of nationalism, its magnificent and bloody agony. The war has unleashed all national sentiments, all forces of nationalism that were still rooted in the peoples. It is the great mobilization, the great parade of nationalism. One cannot go any further. Nationalism is exhausted to the dregs. And yet, this very World War has shown that peoples cannot separate themselves nationally in their development. Nationalism is now burning in a high flame; what will remain is ashes."[11]

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[11]Die Glocke 1:2

Finally, I formulated the socialist proletariat's position on the outcome of the war as follows:

"We do not want to return to our former powerlessness. We want to become a new power. This, the power of the proletariat in every state and its global union while safeguarding the interests of each individual nation, is also the only guarantee of lasting peace."[12]

As you can see, I have expressed myself clearly enough. To attribute imperialist or nationalist views to me, one had to lie unscrupulously. Liars were found; there is usually no shortage of such people. However, before I address the liars, I would like to discuss the tactical differences of opinion that actually existed between me and even the most radical wing of the Russian defeatists, such as Lenin, Martov, and Trotsky.

The Russian defeatists maintained that the Entente's victory had strengthened the position of the Tsarist government. From this, a clear and simple revolutionary tactic emerged for Russia. But how was German Social Democracy to act under such circumstances? If the German workers had been told: do not go to war, turn your weapons against your government, this would, of course, have meant playing into the hands of the Tsarist government. So there was no other option but to go to war.

There were some clever people who thought that German Social Democracy should have said neither yes nor no and abstained from the vote on war credits. In other words, "preserve innocence and amass capital." However, German Social Democracy is incapable of such cunning. We were not faced with the intellectual question of preserving our own salvation, but with the necessity of giving the German workers a clear and concise answer: Should they go to war or against the war?

At the beginning of the war, I heard the following objection from Russian comrades: Even if the German Social Democrats had voted against the war, the German army would still have won, and therefore the danger from Tsarism was by no means so threatening. However, the war had already been going on for almost four years, and the Central Powers were at times in a very difficult situation; how could anyone still claim that the danger wasn't great!

Far more serious was the argument that if German social democracy had decided to revolutionize, revolution would have broken out throughout Europe, bringing an end to the

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[12]Die Glocke, 1:1

war. However, we see more and more that the Russian Revolution has not yet led to a revolution in any other country. And this in the fourth year of the war! What would have happened if a revolution had broken out in Germany at the very beginning of the war? The armies of the Entente would have ravaged Germany with tremendous enthusiasm, and the brave Russian troops would have marched into Berlin to the praise and glory of the Tsar.

Anyone who favored Russia's defeat had to reckon with a German victory. To fail to acknowledge this was to close one's eyes to reality. But a German victory, it was argued, would be a triumph of Prussian militarism. So how should one decide? Nothing simpler. One had to choose the lesser of two evils, according to the old Social Democratic rule. And there could be no doubt that German conditions were preferable to those of Tsarist Russia.

The decision was all the easier for me because I believed in the historical mission of German Social Democracy and knew that the World War would in itself be an extraordinarily powerful revolutionary factor.

The political experience I had gained in the ranks of German Social Democracy, whose ideological development over the last 25 years has been inextricably linked to my name led me, as well as my scholarly work, to employ a complex method in determining the tactics of Social Democracy. In doing so, I consider: 1. the general conditions of the capitalist world; 2. the Interrelationships between the fighting forces of the individual capitalist states; 3. the level of political development and the power of the mass organization of the proletariat in the individual countries.

As early as 1895, based on an analysis of the world market, I foresaw in my essays "The Trade Unions and Social Democracy" the rapid growth of capitalist industry, the intensification and clash of the commercial and political interests of capitalist countries, and the world catastrophe that would bring this development to a close and create the transition to socialism. From this, contrary to the view then prevalent in socialist circles, which today could be described as Bolshevik, I concluded that this would primarily open up extensive opportunities for the trade union struggle of the proletariat. In political terms, I called for a concentration of forces on the struggle for the eight-hour workday. In this way, I thought, the proletariat would best meet the social-revolutionary solution that would result from the general conditions of the development of capitalist industry and competition that had taken place since that time, the unprecedented boom in industrialization.

All the events that had taken place since that time—the unprecedented boom in industrial activity, the colonial wars, the war between Russia and Japan, the Russian Revolution, the Turkish Revolution, the extraordinary increase in cartels and trusts, the concentration of banking capital, the competition between England and Germany, and the intensification of their political relations, the Pan-Americanism of the United States—all this corresponded fully to what I had foreseen and apparently prepared the way for the solution.

Then the catastrophe of the World War broke out.

Now it was a matter of determining the interrelationships of the capitalist forces at work in it

The Entente powers, by their alliance with the Russian autocracy, already provoked the strongest opposition. But that was not the end of the matter. The Entente powers, which had rallied around England, whose capitalist world power was nearing its end, were essentially fighting for a lost cause and thus came into the position of representatives of the economic and political backwardness.

The liberal rhetoric spouted by the politicians and newspapers of the Entente could not alter this state of affairs. The essence of the matter lay not in the words, but in the position that the group of countries in question had assumed in the world conflict. This position dictated its policies, while everything else served only as a cover.

In contrast, the Central Powers, quite contrary to the internal motives of their governments, played a revolutionary role in the World War.

The revolutionary character of the political position of a great state is undoubtedly a far more important political factor than the political irrationality or the political insight of its government

England wanted to preserve and strengthen its position as a world power. Germany, on the other hand, fought for freedom of the seas. Germany wanted to create a railway connection to the Indian Ocean through Baghdad. England made every effort to block this route. Germany, supported by the development of its industry, flooded all markets with its manufactured goods. England wanted to forcibly close all these markets to Germany and secure a monopoly for itself. England wanted to plunder and harass Germany to such an extent that it would no longer be able to compete with it.

The political plans of the Entente also corresponded to this. Now, in view of the published secret documents, this can no longer be doubted. The plan was to tear Germany and Austria to pieces in order to weaken them forever. The wheel of history was to be turned back and Central Europe was to return it to the helpless state it had found itself in during the 1840s. Listening to the Entente politicians speak now, it seems all these plans were a sad misunderstanding. Of course, they now have to retreat because the war results did not meet the expectations of the Entente statesmen. But had they been victorious, they would not have abandoned their plans; on the contrary, they would have given their imaginations even more leeway. The outcome of the World War was therefore also one that, aside from the possible triumph of Russian Tsarism, was not a matter of indifference to the proletariat. It was absolutely necessary that not the conservative, but the progressive forces of capitalism should emerge victorious.

The victory of the Central Powers opened up wide prospects for the industrial development of all countries, while the victory of the Entente, on the contrary, had to restrict this development, forcing it into violent 'restraints.'

For German workers in particular, the question of the integrity of the Reich and its industrial development was simultaneously the question of their own future. The blow directed against a unified Germany and against German industry was also a blow against German Social Democracy. One had to consider a third factor from a general standpoint: the strength and organization of the proletariat. Here, however, lay the long-established fact that German Social Democracy was ahead of all other socialist parties. One could criticize it as much as one liked. But nevertheless, there was no doubt that if German Social Democracy could not achieve socialism, the others certainly would not.

The intimidation tactics of Junker rape and Prussian militarism, with which the Ebertian phrase-mongers of the Entente concealed their imperialist desires, could not confuse me. I knew that the war would, under all circumstances, democratize and revolutionize the German army. Consequently, I considered it more correct not to let Social Democracy be driven by the army, but rather to unite the two.

This was my position on the World War. Of course, I could have been mistaken. Errors could have crept in both the starting points and the assessment of the forces involved; moreover, much depended on the course of the war. But I was not mistaken. The course of

the war, the origins and transformations of the Russian Revolution, and the picture of the war's liquidation that now presents itself to us all speak in my favor.

This time, my opinion was in complete agreement with that of German Social Democracy.

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Rebuttal to the Slanderers.

How much paper was written on, how much ink and bile was splashed, how much filth was gathered to smear me. Had this putrid atmosphere reached me, I would have suffocated. But I remained outside this polluted air. Everything that was brought against me corresponded so little to what constituted the true essence of my thoughts and feelings that it seemed to me as if everything were taking place on a completely different plane and I were a detached spectator

By this I do not mean to say that I gave free rein to slander. I would have strangled the hydra of lies and slander right at the beginning, before it had even sprouted a thousand heads, if I had not been prevented by censorship and the newspaper boycott. I exposed the murky source of the newspaper campaign unleashed against me right from the start; I protested and issued statements. But both the censored and the illegal Russian press silenced me. Several months passed before the Paris-based "Nashé Slovo" had an opportunity to publish my letter. Lenin published a pointless critique of my essays. Trotsky insulted me, while at the same time acting in the role of a grateful student

Why all this? Because public opinion in Russia in 1914 was different from that in 1904. Bourgeois patriotism in Russia had grown and strengthened to such an extent that it had gripped all levels of society and split the Social Democrats.

In 1904, the defeatists had pursued an open and clear policy and certainly hadn't closed their eyes to the fact that a Russian defeat would inevitably lead to a Japanese victory. In 1914, people were afraid not only to express themselves clearly but even to fully consider the idea, and they readily embraced the notion of a collapse of all combatants, which clouded the horizon and relieved them of the need to draw decisive conclusions. This was equally convenient for soothing their consciences and diverting their attention.

This half-baked solution was very welcome to those socialist simpletons who didn't give any thought to solving the questions brought to the fore by the war, since for them all these questions were solved from the outset and once and for all in the slogan of revolutionary agitation. My position was too complicated and too resolute for them. Debating me was, of

course, difficult; insulting me, on the other hand, was easy and also served as protection against the attacks of the Russian patriots.

That the Russian patriots, including Plekhanov's followers, attacked me with fury needs no further explanation.

When the revolution began, my first concern was to make Russian readers aware of my true position on the war. I collected everything I had written during the war and prepared a Russian edition of these writings. Friends offered to take care of the publication in St. Petersburg. But then the ominous trial against the defeatists began, including myself, and everything fell apart. My friends disappeared, my acquaintances lost their voices and memories, and to this day I don't even know where the manuscripts went. The malicious newspaper campaign thus had the perfect opportunity to unfold unhindered. It began with the official representative of the Tsarist Government, the Russian envoy Ssavinsky in Sofia. After the lecture I gave in Sofia at the invitation of the Bulgarian Social Democrats, Ssavinsky summoned the Russian and Bulgarian newspaper correspondents and gave them the order: write against Parvus! This is an established fact. The attacks against me were based from the very beginning on the most blatant political fraud: a quotation from a forged newspaper article with my signature, written by Russian political agents and published in 1911 in a Serbian newspaper issued with the money of the Russian Okhrana. I exposed the forgery at the time and publicly branded its perpetrators as Russian provocateurs. The Serbian socialist press vigorously supported me in this. Now I have repeated the revelation in the Bulgarian press of the connection between the newspaper smear campaign unleashed against me and the Ochrana, which was uncovered. The newspaper swindlers, exposed as forgers, then resorted to slander and insinuation.

The Romanian press, which had long been working with Russian money, took up the campaign. Now Alexinsky got involved, glad to have found an opportunity to stir up trouble. Then the matter reached the chauvinistic Italian press and the like-minded French press. Next, the people from "Novoye Vremya" intervened, from where the smear campaign went back to France and Italy, then to England and America, and finally was tossed back and forth from country to country, swelling ever larger and taking on enormous dimensions, until a gigantic newspaper polyp arose, encompassing half the world, formless, formless, and impossible to overlook, making all starting and ending points disappear into itself. Now

it was no longer possible to distinguish where one thing came from another; barking echoed from every crack in the newspaper doors

The reader knows my position. One can agree with me or not. But one must acknowledge that the way I posed the question contained neither imperialism nor chauvinism. And in the entire mountain of Pasquill literature directed against me, one would not find a single line actually written by me, not a single verified action I took, upon which one could base an opposing opinion!

Because they had no opportunity to refer to an opinion I had actually expressed, the Pasquillants proceeded by bringing up the opinion of a person and holding me responsible for it. This led to considerations of the following kind: Scheidemann was an imperialist (which is, incidentally, completely false), Parvus supported Scheidemann, therefore Parvus was an imperialist. Or: An article praising Hindenburg had appeared in "Die Glocke," which is published by Parvus, therefore Parvus had become a chauvinist. Insofar as any more or less understandable quotations existed at all, they came from "Die Glocke." Consequently, I would like to elaborate somewhat on my relationship with this journal.

I founded "Die Glocke" in 1915 as an independent socialist journal. Its editorial staff was and is managed entirely independently by Haenisch and a committee of contributors. I myself only appear as publisher. When I founded the journal, I did not think that the war would drag on for so long. I thought it would be over in a few months and intended to put the main questions of postwar economic transformation on the agenda. However, the war dragged on and pushed interest in what would come after into the background. The pressure of events made it necessary to address war-related issues. In its overall direction, the journal reflected my view, namely the necessity of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion; in this, it was unavoidable that the intellectual confusion that had arisen in socialist circles under the influence of the war was evident in the arguments of the individual authors.

The national passions ignited by the war did not leave German Social Democracy untouched, even if it was by no means as gripped by them as the socialist movement in France. In the free forum that "Die Glocke" provided, this had to be expressed, and was expressed all the more so because the journal generally advocated that the war must be won. Had I been the editor of the journal, I would have reined in the authors who were

veering too far toward the nationalist side; but, as I said, the editorship was not in my hands.

According to the Russian Bolsheviks, I should have shut down the magazine at the slightest difference between its views and my own. However, my attitude toward a literary endeavor is quite different. I am not afraid of disagreements. I believe that the tactics of the workers' movement are the result of collective intellectual work, which would be impossible without clashes of opinions. I consider it necessary not to stifle an opposing opinion, but rather to give it the opportunity to express itself fully. The staff of "The Bell" before the war, in the majority belonged to the extreme left wing of the party. Haenisch, Lensch, Cunow, these were all sharpshooters and pillars of revolutionary Marxism. If one were to exclude these, what would remain?

I am only responsible for what I myself have written, and of course cannot assume responsibility for essays that have been published by others outside my control. As for the essay on Hindenburg, which is also cited in a distorted manner in all the polemics directed against me, it only made it into "Die Glocke" due to an oversight by the editorial staff, and its author was immediately barred from the journal.

My own position on the cult of war heroes is set out in my essay "A Conversation in Wartime," which appeared in "Die Glocke." However, political polemics constitute only a small part of the content of the pasquille directed against me. Its main content is insinuation, the attempt to diminish my political personality. For example, a major role is played by the reference to the fact that I acquired German citizenship and travel freely in Germany as well as abroad.

Of course, this is a vast difference compared to the time when I was driven from one German fatherland after another. The change of heart, however, did not occur on my side, but on the side of the German government. Especially at the beginning of the war, the German government sought to curry favor with the Social Democrats. It was also impossible to manage without them. How many representatives of the Social Democrats and the trade unions joined various committees, including all sorts of central institutions, during the war! How, then, could the German government have denied me recognition of my citizenship,

which I had fought for through decades of political, literary, and scientific activity on German soil?

Incidentally, the governments of the Central Powers changed their behavior not only towards the German Social Democrats, but also towards the Russian revolutionaries. Certainly not out of idealism. The war had brought Russia into a revolutionary situation, and the governments understood this. It would have been ridiculous to expect the governments to continue persecuting the Russian revolutionaries with the police even during the war. The war disrupted everything. While France and England expelled the Russian émigrés, Austria released Lenin and allowed Ryazanov to move freely there, while Germany permitted Russian émigrés to transit through the country in order to return to Russia.

Another point that the slanderers keep bringing up is the fact that I have acquired a fortune. I must elaborate on this in more detail. There were quite a few wealthy people and wholesalers in the socialist movement. St. Simon amassed a fortune through war supplies, Fourrier was a merchant, R. Owen was a factory owner, Fr. Engels was also a factory owner and a major capitalist; without his money, Karl Marx would have fared very badly. In the German party, the best-known example is P. Singer, who was a factory owner and a very rich man. Etc

I first encountered questions of a commercial nature in my career when I was editor-in-chief of the "Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung" (Saxon Workers' Newspaper) in Dresden. Despite the rapidly increasing number of subscribers under my editorship, the newspaper remained in debt. To determine the reasons for this, I began to study the commercial side of the business. My investigations showed me that some expenses were too high, that the contract with the printing house was unfavorable, and that the newspaper needed to be placed on a completely different technical footing. I developed a plan for a commercial reorganization of the newspaper and implemented this plan with the help of the trade union and party organizations. Since then, the newspaper has become one of the party's most widely circulated and profitable.

In 1902, after the Congress of German Social Democracy in Lübeck, I became convinced that I needed my own journal. At that time, I was being attacked from all sides because of my essays on opportunism. Kautsky concentrated then wisely retreated, while A. Bebel attacked me most horribly. A year later, the same Bebel shook my hand and thanked me for

the same essays. But at that time, things were very bad, and the party publishers with whom I had connections refused to print my writings. Complete boycott.

I decided to publish a large journal, but this required large sums of money. Where was I to get them?

Consequently, I resolved to devise some way to make money. To invent something, technology is necessary. It was therefore clear that I had to delve into some area of law, into the realm where capitalist property relations are regulated by all sorts of legal subtleties, to investigate whether there might be a commercial interest to be found there. And indeed, I found one. Russia had not yet acceded to the Berne Convention for the international protection of authors' rights, and I found a way to protect these rights for both Russian authors abroad and foreign authors in Russia. In other words, I discovered the possibility of securing these authors' fees and theater royalties. On this basis, I built the plan for a publishing house and concluded contracts with a whole series of authors, including M. Gorky, for the exercise of their copyrights and for the publication of their works abroad

I will discuss this venture in more detail because it will enable me to shed light on my business dealings with M. Gorky, which have also been mentioned quite a bit in the newspapers. My plan was as follows: to acquire a fortune through publishing and bookselling and to use this fortune to found a magazine. My venture initially went very well; but then, as is usually the case with new publishing ventures, especially with insufficient initial capital, it ran into difficulties and encountered obstacles.

Moreover, the Russian movement of 1904 and 1905 began. I decided to go to Russia. However, I was bound by my publishing company, and so it had to be liquidated. Liquidation was not possible without a prior agreement with the "Snanie" company in St. Petersburg, with whom I had contracts. But the "Snanie" company dragged things out month after month. In the end, I left everything and departed for St. Petersburg.

When I was planning my publishing company, A. [Arthur] Stadthagen warned me: "Beware, my dear fellow, that your business doesn't consume you entirely!" "You can rest assured," I replied, "if my business should clash with politics, then business will lose out." And so it was indeed.

I still had various business settlements with M. Gorky I owed him several sums that I had earned from the sale and performance of his "The Lower Depths," while I was also entitled to a portion of all foreign royalties and fees that he would receive for his works to be published between 1903 and 1913—this as compensation for the fact that he only received foreign royalties and fees at all thanks to the legal protection I had devised. Later, after my escape from Siberia, when I returned to Berlin, Rosa Luxemburg told me that during Gorky's stay in Berlin, the publishing company had been liquidated by amicable agreement and the mutual claims declared settled. "You did Gorky a service," I told her. But settled is settled, so I let the matter rest. I haven't heard from Gorky since. But where does the gossip come from that I took advantage of him?

If he truly believes he has been cheated, I suggest he have another accounting done. Let him calculate what I owe him and what I am entitled to receive from him according to the 1903 contract. Should this reveal a difference in his favor, I will pay it immediately; but should it reveal a difference in my favor, he should transfer it to some socialist workers' institution.

The Russian Revolution had distracted me from my publishing, bookselling, and commercial plans. Returning to Germany, I devoted myself once again to my academic work. Financial issues and the burgeoning war crisis formed the focus of my studies. These studies, combined with political activity, left no room for commercial plans. In 1910, I decided to go to Constantinople to learn more about the Turkish Revolution and to study the diplomatic machinations, especially at the very heart of the Gordian knot.

In Constantinople, I found precisely what I had expected: the diplomatic connections and machinations, the combinations of banking groups, and imperialist maneuvering lay almost openly before the eyes of the scientifically prepared observer. The results of my research made a great impression in Turkey, especially my analysis of the financial system through which European capital drew Turkey into its net.

As early as the 1990s, I occasionally mocked Ed. Bernstein's polemic about his veneration of the "brilliant royalty directors." I said that it wasn't about genius, but rather those objective opportunities for enrichment created by the capitalist development of industry. In Turkey, these opportunities opened up before me. However, it was difficult for me to access them as long as I lacked my own capital and trade relations. Over time, I acquired both

capital and connections. When the World War began, the paths to capitalist accumulation suddenly lay wide open before me.

The war brought many people of liberal professions into trade. This happened for the simple reason that the war had severed the connections of the world market and mobilization had emptied the factories and trading offices, while the enormous demand of wartime, with its unlimited purchasing power, gave commercial and industrial activity a new and unexpected direction. I had the advantage over others in that I understood the capitalist connections of the events and that I had already established a commercial base before the war.

The general public assumes that anyone who profited during wartime must have enriched themselves through high prices. However, this is not always the case. I personally employed a completely different method. I swam against the tide and profited not from price increases, but from lowering prices – that is, not from exploiting the demand for goods, but from organizing the supply of goods.

Such are the circumstances, which are easily clarified because my business dealings have brought me into contact with hundreds of people, with banks, trading companies, steamship companies, brokers, commission agents, lawyers, notaries, municipal administrations, cooperatives, etc., etc. The slanderers, however, naturally had no interest in letting the truth come to light, but on the contrary, strove to obscure it. The charlatans had an even easier time, operating with platitudes like "has enriched himself," "travels freely in Germany," "advocates for a victory for Germany," and covering their absurdities with insults. All this was repeated not ten times, but a hundred times, came from various sources, no one knew where, and became ingrained in the public consciousness.

The people of the Okhrana worked on command; they were joined by the people from "Novoye Vremya" and Milyukov's supporters; behind them marched our own correspondents and other reporters, eager to shine with a sensational story; into this mob crept the professional slanderers and snoops right from the start; forgotten and half-forgotten writers and retired politicians soon made themselves heard, because they longed to shine again before the public, if only for a minute, at the hands of a sensational falie. Finally, when the sensation was already there, several of my acquaintances appeared, who hastened

to turn against me and not be suspected of sympathizing with me. Great is the meanness of people; but even greater is human cowardice!

To deal individually with each of the slanderers and trolls whose name is Legion, I have neither the possibility nor the desire. Consequently, I would like to limit myself to a few particularly outstanding types in characterizing this whole pack of scoundrels.

Of the professional slanderers, Mr. Alexinski, the former Social Democratic deputy in the Second State Duma, must of course be mentioned first and foremost. To dispute his preeminence in this area is impossible, not least because he was expelled from a whole series of socialist organizations for slander. To dishonor someone, to falsely accuse someone, to quarrel with someone, to trip someone up—all this happens to him as easily, as naturally, as the singing of the nightingale or the barking of the dog. This is the type of Thersites: petty, envious, and venomous. A shoemaker by trade, Alexinski is fully aware that his proletarianism is not acquired but inherited, just as there is, for example, an inherited nobility. However, the proletariat is also of different kinds. The proletariat is a revolutionary class, but one held in bondage. If the class position of the proletariat were merely a showcase of human virtues, what would be the point of the struggle at all? The range of other base and ugly feelings—brutality, envy, spite, malice, spite, insolence, and all that is unfortunately inherent in human nature—are not eradicated by poverty and bondage, but on the contrary, find fertile ground for their development under these living conditions. Men like Alexinsky also appear as expressions of these dark sides of the working class. Alexinsky belongs to the proletariat, but he characterizes it in the same way as the mold in cellar apartments, like the belching of poverty. The true intellectual representatives of the fighting proletariat are characters of a completely different nature.

Immediately after Alexinsky, Mr. Burtsev must be mentioned, the latter as the most outstanding representative of reportage literature. Strange how success can sometimes degrade a person! I have known Mr. Burtsev for a long time. I first met him in Zurich in 1886. He told me then that, while in exile, he had read the Russian newspapers from the 1960s and had become convinced that the Russian liberals of that time had written very radically, and that, in his opinion, it was therefore not permissible to speak of Russian liberalism with such disdain. This naive discovery astonished me. I replied that for us Social Democrats, not only the Russian liberal rhetoric of the 1960s, but also developed European

liberalism, was insufficient: "If you stay abroad for any length of time, you will become a Social Democrat."

I was mistaken: Burtsev did not become a Social Democrat. By rummaging around in the archives, he remained alienated from the Western European life that surrounded him. Moreover, his very archival research showed that he lacked any historical perspective. For over 30 years, this writer has occupied himself with the history of the Russian revolutionary movement and has not once risen above its purely anecdotal aspect.

The modest and naive archivist Burtsev suddenly rose to great fame when the temporary victory of the revolution in 1905 and the Duma's activity offered the opportunity to lift the veil on the secrets of the Russian political police. Burtsev lost his head. Since then, he has only chased sensational stories. The former collector of political legends transformed into a detective, and newspaper reporting replaced archival research. When the newspaper campaign against me was launched, Burtsev could not help but participate. His reporter's prestige demanded it, so to speak. Politically, he was against me. He could not cite any facts against me. What prevented him from admitting this, apart from everything else, was his own Sherlock Holmes-like vanity The others, his contemporaries in the field of political reportage, loudly leveled accusations against me, while he, the famous Burtsev, knew nothing about the matter.

Then he resorted to a cunning and spiteful act: he declared that he knew nothing discrediting to say about Parvus; but it seemed that something had happened, that something existed, which, just in case, needed to be investigated, and he concluded with a unmotivated insinuation, by calling me an agent of Wilhelm II. This method of unfounded suspicion, which Burtsev applied to me, is the most repugnant method of the former Tsarist Okhrana. So low has the champion of the purity of political morals in Russia sunk! That was even before the revolution. Burtsev has not published the promised investigations to this day. And yet, if he had actually conducted investigations, he should have first and foremost convinced himself that the newspaper smear campaign against me was organized by the Okhrana. It should have been virtually impossible for him not to have come across this fact, since the revolution had provided him with all diplomatic documents, as well as those of the gendarmerie. I know from communications from the Bulgarian Prime Minister Radoslavov that the Tsarist regime had also taken diplomatic steps. Simultaneously with the

newspaper raid in Bulgaria, this must be in the files, but Burtsev remains silent. In front of all honest people, I call him a cowardly slanderer who conceals facts to further slander.

The slander, which was repeated again and again in a thousand different forms and on a thousand different pages, had finally so clouded minds that the public wanted to hear nothing but bad things about me. A social psychosis arose, of the kind one encounters occasionally during the Dreyfus or Beilis trials. Public opinion no longer waited for evidence, even found it bothersome; it demanded only confirmation of the accusation. At that time, it was enough merely to be acquainted with me to be doused with dirt. For this, all who joined the chorus of scolds, lively applause. Now gentlemen of the type of the former Russian émigré Semenov appeared.

Whenever I met Semenov, I involuntarily thought of the verses by Nekrasov, which, in a more literal translation, read approximately as follows: "Pakhom is like a windmill. But it is not a bird; for however much it may beat its wings, it will certainly not fly away.

This man, with a horse's head and a sheep's brain, possesses at least a few representative qualities and thus managed to insinuate himself into the literary circles of Paris. While still a high school student in the early 1980s, he had, through something or other, helped someone from the Narodnaya Volya movement escape the pursuing police and then fled abroad himself. In Paris, he was received in salons and newspaper offices as a young man of the Russian Revolution, a role he retained until he was old and gray. In Russia, several generations of revolutionaries had succeeded one another, social conditions themselves had changed, the Social Democratic Party had replaced Narodnaya Volya, the Socialist Revolutionary Party had emerged and grown large, while Semenov—whose real name is Simanovsky—continued to play the role of a Russian revolutionary before Parisian salonnières and in the editorial offices of Parisian newspapers.

After the amnesty of 1905, he returned to Russia. In Russia, he distinguished himself in no way. He sank into complete obscurity. But now he suddenly reappeared with his revelations. All my contact with him consisted solely of his negotiations with me in 1903 regarding a French edition of M. Gorky's "The Lower Depths." He had to do this, given that, as already mentioned elsewhere, I protected Gorky's copyright. Previously, Russian writers could be translated and staged without any oversight or compensation. Now, however, one had to pay a fee and obtain the author's permission. Semenov and I never had any

relationship other than a purely business one. But apparently, he only needed a pretext to appear in the press. He said nothing new. Rather, he merely repeated the gossip and slander that others had already spread. For a moment, this talentless windbag once again captured the public's attention, only to disappear again.

The procedure of the Pasquillants became extremely simple: wherever there was even a suspicion of having ties to the Central Powers, I, too, was immediately named. They weren't ashamed of any absurdities, true to the saying: "Liar, Frederick, your turn has come." And all this was done with deep conviction and the utmost persistence. "Vecherneye Vremya," for example, claimed in the most positive terms that I served as editor of newspapers published in Germany for prisoners of war, while I had absolutely nothing to do with these newspapers. The same newspaper reported that I had founded a society for the liberation of Ukraine, even providing details about my dealings with a certain German consul, etc.—all blatant lies. To dispel these fabrications, one only needed to ask: How do you know this? What are you basing this on? Where is the evidence? But no one asked such questions. On the contrary, attacks were launched from all sides who gladly accepted the lie and ensured its further dissemination.

After the July Uprising, the Provisional Government dragged me into the trial against the Bolsheviks. The accusation against the Bolsheviks was based on the business correspondence of Fürstenberg-Hanetzki, which they wanted to ascribe a political character to. Not a single line from me was included in any of the files. My financial transactions with Fürstenberg were purely commercial and took place Copenhagen, openly in full view of everyone. It was also peculiar that I, a German citizen who was outside of Russia, was held accountable in Russia for high treason. However, this peculiarity becomes understandable when one considers that by including me in the trial as a defendant, the Russian government deprived the other defendants of the opportunity to call me as a witness.

The Kerensky government conducted its investigation against me with great fervor. Had it been able to discover even the slightest thing against me that might discredit me, it would not have hesitated to use it. The surveillance of my person extended throughout Europe: the Russian, Romanian, English, French, and Italian authorities were involved. My house in Copenhagen was surrounded by agents of several states. My every move was tracked. My letters were intercepted and opened. And yet, even the extremely biased preliminary judicial investigation by the Russian Provisional Government could not uncover evidence to

construct an indictment against me. The government preferred to let the trial proceed. Sands run away, I demanded nothing more passionate than a Court Hearing.

I myself would not have a trial, which would have given me the opportunity to expose the political swindles spread against me. Since I was unable to exert any influence on the course of the trial in St. Petersburg, I tried to hold accountable some Russian correspondents living in Copenhagen who were sending slanderous reports about me to the Petrograd newspapers. However, it turned out that, according to Danish law, it was not possible to hold these people accountable. I was able to prove that their reports were blatant lies. But blatant lies do not involve any crime punishable by law. The obvious aim of the correspondents was to discredit me; but since the experienced slanderers did not use expressions universally recognized as insulting—in other words, since they themselves did not publicly admit that they intended to disgrace me—it was not possible to hold them accountable.

To illustrate the way they operated, I would like to cite the following example. On July 19, 1917, all the Petrograd newspapers carried the following official government announcement: how these gentlemen got it was a mystery.

"Today, the following telegram arrived from Copenhagen, from a reliable source: The German Social Democrat, the well-known deputy Haase, stated during his transit to Stockholm, in a conversation with a local Russian journalist, that the well-known German Social Democrat Parvus (Helphand) was acting as an intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the German government. The same Parvus has provided the Russian Bolsheviks with funds originating from the German government."

When I read this message, I immediately telegraphed Haase and asked him for clarification. Haase replied with a telegram stating that he had, of course, never said anything of the sort to anyone. He also published this denial in the newspapers. For my part, I explained that I had not given the Bolsheviks any funds.

The slander was thus exposed. But its perpetrators, the Russian correspondents living in Copenhagen, didn't even flinch. They offered no response, acknowledged the slander as slander, and continued to lie as if nothing had happened. To grasp the full depravity of these villains' actions, one must remember that the Bolsheviks were accused of high treason at

the time and faced the death penalty. Without shame or any qualms of conscience, the Russian correspondents in Copenhagen—Messrs. Wugmann, Karo, Leitis, and Trotsky (not the socialist, but another)—these names must be mentioned to expose their perpetrators. In their pursuit of sensationalism and newspaper fees, they notoriously disseminated false information, even though they must have known that they were thereby condemning dozens of Russia's best men.

A few words specifically about Mr. Wugmann, who everywhere refers to himself as an old acquaintance of mine. In fact, at the beginning of the 1980s, he belonged to the revolutionary organization in Odessa in which I was also involved. However, he wasn't a member of the organization. Rather, we kept him at arm's length, as we considered him a very narrow-minded person. Incidentally, he withdrew from the movement very soon afterward and, instead of revolutionary agitation, chose selling a lexicon as his occupation. Then he devoted himself to the profession of reporter and worked for the provincial press, such as the "Odeskija Novosti." I completely lost track of him for many years and only met him again during the war in Copenhagen. He sought me out and introduced himself as an old acquaintance. The slanderous campaign against me was already in full swing at that time. Wugmann feigned outrage at it and expressed his sympathy for me The renewed acquaintance lasted until the moment I learned that Wugmann himself had participated in the slanderous attacks against me. From time to time he came to see me, engaged in tedious conversations, expressed lively interest in my well-being, and was particularly pleased with my business successes. I do not know what interests compelled him to cover himself in shame. But there is no doubt that he acted against his own convictions.

After the scandalous fiasco with the telegram about Haase, the Provisional Government not only did not break off its relations with the Copenhagen correspondents, but on the contrary, forged even closer ties. Copenhagen became the center where Pressbandits, in association with English and French agents, with old Russian Okhrana people, new Russian spies, supported by the Russian Provisional Government and with the money of the Entente, formed a conspiratorial organization whose task, of course, was not solely to continue the smear campaign against me.

When the mendacious Provisional Government, having discredited itself through military defeats and utterly disgraced itself by participating in the Kornilov conspiracy, was driven

out by the Bolsheviks, the Copenhagen gang of poisoners of public opinion lost its base in Russia. They then sought another outlet and found it in the Copenhagen press.

The serious newspapers, which value their reputation, refused one after another to print their pieces; however, they found asylum in the tabloid press. Finally, the whole high society pitched its tents in the newspaper "Köbenhavn," which is known to straddle the line between sensationalism and tabloid fodder

"Köbenhavn" published over fifty articles against me, brimming with empty phrases, slander, insinuation, lies, and sheer nonsense. The most common, well-known facts were distorted and mixed with the most ludicrous drivel. The whole thing gives the impression of a phantasmagoria of the kind that the moon is made in Hamburg, and that a lame cooper makes it. The majority of these crazy articles were then collected into a pamphlet, which was distributed free of charge throughout Denmark. It would be interesting to know where the money for this came from, but even more interesting to know who needed it and what they needed it for. The answer to the latter question is provided by the political tendency of the attacks.

"Köbenhavn" attacked me primarily because I supported the pacifist tendency of the Bolsheviks. I gladly accept this sin! Yes, I did everything in my power to bring European peace closer. The reader knows that my stance on war was largely determined by the struggle against Russian Tsarism. As soon as this argument was made [As soon as the Tsar was toppled], I myself immediately advocated for peace. Even before the revolution, when the military might of Tsarism had been shattered and there was nothing more to fear from that quarter, I began to agitate for peace. From my perspective, there was even less reason to wage war against revolutionary Russia.

Consequently, after the overthrow of Tsarism, I was one of the first to raise the question of convening an International Socialist Congress. I consider it one of the main errors of the Kerensky government that it yielded to the influence of diplomats and abandoned the idea of a Socialist Congress. Had the Russian revolutionary government consistently pursued the path of peace preparation, had it consequently limited itself to a defensive stance without embarking on the adventure of Brusilov's offensive, and had it persistently advocated for the convening of an international socialist congress, we would most likely already have general peace; in any case, peace would have been incomparably more favorable for Russia then

than it is now, and at the same time the Russian revolution could have developed its powers in the realm of constructive activity, and the pogrom currently unfolding under the banner of the Bolsheviks would probably have been avoided. When the Bolsheviks came to power, German Social Democracy, at my initiative, sent them greetings and extended a comradely hand to work together for peace. At the same time, I reiterated the demand for the immediate convening of an international socialist congress to establish general peace. From the Danish point of view, of course, nothing could be objected to. A neutral country whose rights and interests are violated at every turn by the warring parties can only welcome any attempt to hasten peace. Anyone who follows public opinion in Denmark knows that it is in favor of peace. "Köbenhavn" has through the attacks on me showed its cards, and it turned out that it is a tool in the hands of the Entente imperialists.

Since the masses in Denmark are in favor of peace, the newspaper "Köbenhavn", which furiously criticized all attempts to initiate peace negotiations, was bound to clash with the Danish Social Democrats as the main representative of the pacifist movement in the country. Accordingly, it quickly moved from polemics against me to polemics against the Danish Social Democrats.

The Danish Social Democrats' position on the question of the World War is far from agreeing with my own. From the beginning of the war, they strove for the strictest neutrality. For me, the German Social Democrat, such conduct was impossible; I could not be neutral. Points of contact between us on the question of the war only arose when attempts began to bring about a rapprochement between the socialist parties of the belligerent countries

Despite all this, my political ties to Danish Social Democracy were very limited. I was once well acquainted with Knudsen, one of the founders of Danish Social Democracy. But Knudsen is dead, and the current representatives of the movement were all new to me when I arrived in Copenhagen, with the exception of Siver Olsen. I don't know if I visited the offices of "The Social Democrat" more than three times during my three years in Copenhagen. I mention all this because the newspaper "Köbenhavn" added to the ridiculous gossip that I was the leader of the Bolsheviks the further claim that I had inspired the Danish Social Democracy. To make this nonsense credible, the newspaper "Köbenhavn" refers to the role I played in organizing the coal business of the Danish trade unions. Of course, the newspaper "Köbenhavn" did not fail to embellish this with insinuations of the

lowest kind, which, as usual, were taken from the Entente press. I must therefore briefly recount the history of this undertaking.

As early as the winter of 1915, a shortage of coal was being felt in Denmark. Before the war, it was England which supplied coal almost exclusively to Denmark. The war restricted these deliveries and soon created a coal shortage.

The most obvious, but by no means the only, cause of this phenomenon is the effectiveness of German submarines. Aside from this primary factor, several other factors significantly influenced the situation. The more England mobilized, the smaller the number of workers available for industry and mining became. Furthermore, England militarized its entire production. It drove everyone into the factories to produce weapons and munitions, and consequently, the mining industry suffered increasingly from a labor shortage. The war consumed enormous quantities of iron, but iron requires coal – a large portion of the output was thus spent on war production, and consequently, less and less remained for export. At the same time, England also had to supply Italy and France with coal during the war, countries that had previously received significant quantities of coal from Germany. Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of German submarines was bound to have a particularly noticeable impact on English coal exports to neutral countries. As the war dragged on, the conditions for coal production in England itself also changed: the coal mines had been severely damaged by the exploitative practices during the war, and a shortage of wood has been made noticeable, etc. It will take years to restore English coal production.

When the Danish trade unionists saw that coal prices were rising, and that the working people, who bought their coal from small retailers, were suffering particularly badly, they decided, on the initiative of their secretary Kiefer, to supply their members with fuel themselves. They were, of course, completely indifferent as to whether it was English or German coal, as long as it was as cheap as possible. However, it turned out that German coal was cheaper than English and, moreover, easier to obtain. Consequently, the unions bought up several shiploads of German coal. In the summer of 1916, I made the acquaintance of Comrade Kiefer. He told me about the trade unions' coal venture, the difficulties facing this venture, and the expected coal shortage for the winter. The matter

aroused my particular interest, and I have since discussed it several times with Kiefer and others. Our discussions led to the following result:

1. The primary need for fuel from the working masses, the poor, the towns and municipalities, and its satisfaction must be identified and prioritized.
2. The procurement and sale of fuel must be concentrated as much as possible in order to achieve the lowest possible prices for consumers.
3. The trade unions must be placed at the head of the venture.

These ideas were submitted to the trade union organizations for evaluation, and at the general meeting of all the unions, our plan was approved, and it was accordingly resolved to create the necessary trading organization. However, it wasn't so easy to implement this plan. Coal could only be obtained in sufficient quantities from Germany. In Germany, our intention, especially to attract the people, supplying the masses and social institutions with coal had already garnered us considerable sympathy. The only difficulty was that there was a coal shortage in Germany itself. Coal production was limited, and moreover, Germany had to supply Austria and a whole series of neutral states with coal. Every piece of coal that was exported abroad was literally taken away from the German people. At the same time, of course, there were coal merchants who wanted to take over the supply of German coal and consequently saw an unwelcome competitor in the coal office of the trade unions. The German coal industry, and especially the coal syndicate, didn't care whether the coal was delivered to the trade unions or to any other company in Denmark; however, there was above all great distrust on this side of a trading company that was in the hands of workers.

We encountered even greater difficulties in Länemark. Here, it was impossible to accept the idea that England, great England, would be unable to supply such a small country as Denmark with coal. The English, who until then had complained about the difficulties of coal transport, now changed their tactics when they saw that coal could be delivered in significant quantities from Germany: consequently, they assured everyone in the most positive terms that they would supply the required quantity of coal. Upon strict analysis of the situation of the English coal business, it turned out that the English, as had already happened more than once during the war, were making promises they were simply unable to keep. Nevertheless, their assurances, which they made with tremendous persistence,

were believed even in the most influential Danish circles. Moreover, the English mobilized all means of economic terrorism to thwart the coal trade unions' business.

The Danish coal merchants were informed by the English that if they sold German coal, their deliveries from the Entente countries would be cut off. And despite the growing shortage of fuel, the Danish coal merchants did indeed refuse to accept German coal. The coal depot of the trade unions was denied berths for unloading its steamers and storage space for the coal. Wherever possible, its cargo cranes, even its coal carts and shovels, were taken away.

The English threatened the Danish administrations, which intended to replenish their stocks with German coal, with cutting off deliveries of English coal; they threatened the factories with severing their trade relations. The Danish Employers' Association was hostile to the trade unions' coal business from the outset. It had long ago decided not to enter into any trade relations with the enterprises organized by the trade unions. In short, a boycott in full force! In October and November 1916, the Copenhagen roadstead was occupied by 38 steamers

The steamers, which had delivered coal to the unions and were now waiting to be unloaded, were overflowing. The storage facility in Copenhagen was filled to capacity, while in the provinces, the unions' coal office was unable to secure storage space. Hundreds of thousands in penalties had to be paid for exceeding the steamers' unloading deadlines. The coal wasn't selling. Purchases had to be halved. The unions had 200,000 tons of coal in storage, allowing the newspapers to mock Copenhagen's "black mountains."

The situation was extremely critical. At that moment, the enemies of the trade unions' coal office exerted their final and strongest pressure on it: they succeeded in cutting off its bank credit. In vain we tried to prove that the boycott could not last long, that the winter would shatter it. Some disagreed with us, insisting that the English had promised to deliver the required coal; others correctly grasped the situation but wanted to use it to bring down the trade union organization, while still others feared England. A very well-known bank director told me personally: "You are absolutely right, the coal will run out. We need German coal. But we cannot lend money on it, since the English don't want it; but if we were to act against the will of the English, it would mean committing suicide for our bank."

It was fortunate that I had anticipated the possibility of the bank's credit being cut and had tried to free up as much cash as possible from my business ventures. With these sums and with the help of my personal credit, I managed to provide the coal office with the million it desperately needed at the crucial moment.

Our assumptions proved correct: The English fell far short of their promised delivery, which meant that when the cold set in, everyone rushed to buy German coal. Without it, the situation would have become desperate.

The boycott was overturned. People began buying coal, and at the same time, the financial difficulties disappeared. Business returned to normal.

In the foregoing, I have only given a brief outline of the external complications with which the Coal Office had to contend, but I have not addressed the internal difficulties that had to be overcome in order to create, from nothing, an organization that spread throughout the entire country. Without the trade unions, this would have been unthinkable. The Trade Unions' Coal Office is currently an enterprise that employs over 1,000 people and has an annual turnover of 100 million kroner.

The results achieved by the Danish Trade Unions' Coal Office are clearly evident to everyone. The office supplied Denmark with more coal than would have been possible without it. Incidentally, as early as the summer of 1916, it concluded coal supply contracts for a year and even for a year and a half in advance. Furthermore, the English, for competitive reasons because they feared losing the Danish market, made incredible efforts to also supply English coal to Denmark. Consequently, the coal office also indirectly contributed to increasing coal supplies in this respect.

Coal prices rose enormously everywhere during the war. However, German coal prices were lower than English ones. The Coal Office, by importing German coal, thus supplied coal at a lower price and, to a certain extent, forced English coal merchants to lower their prices. The middlemen's profits were reduced by half. The poor population received their coal at a reduced rate. The Office introduced fixed prices, with a small margin in favor of the enterprise. It was not possible for it to regulate the market on its own, since most of the coal passed through the hands of other merchants throughout this period, while consumers bought coal at any price they wished. It was necessary for the government to intervene. This

was achieved. The Coal Office's rates were now used as the basis for the regulation of coal prices undertaken by the Danish government.

The coal office also provided the trade unions with income, enabling them to significantly replenish their coffers. Far more important, however, is the moral upsurge and stronger organizational consolidation brought about by success in a new field of activity. I have already mentioned that the employers' association was hostile to the trade unions' coal office. The most ardent Danish industrialists claimed that if the trade unions controlled the coal supply, they would be able, should they so choose, to bring the entire industrial activity of the country to a standstill. This is a gross exaggeration, since to this day the majority of Denmark's coal is delivered independently of the trade unions' coal office, and in the event of a strike, Danish capitalists would undoubtedly find enough allies in both Germany and England who would supply them with coal. The fact that the Danish capitalists must reckon with the Coal Office, especially during the war, is proven by the fact that they had to abandon their old resolution not to buy goods from the enterprises headed by the trade unions. The main point is that if the trade unions had not concentrated coal deliveries in the Coal Office, this concentration would most likely have been accomplished by the industrial entrepreneurs and would have placed a powerful weapon against the workers in their hands.

The further course of events depends on whether the Danish trade unions will understand how to consolidate and develop their Coal Office so that it could also serve them as a pillar in protecting the interests of the working class in peacetime

The attacks on the Danish Social Democrats over the Coal Office were evidently also an attempt to create difficulties for the Coal Office itself. Since it was not possible to destroy the Coal Office through external pressure, they now sought to destroy it from within by sowing discord and mistrust among the workers. But it will not come to that; all efforts will be in vain! The following speaks against this:

General situation and the sound judgment of the Danish workers.

I have already pointed out above the serious nature of the causes that led to the reduction of English coal exports. Similar causes were at work in Germany. Consequently, it can be said with certainty that even after a general peace treaty, a coal shortage will be felt for several

more years. Under these circumstances, any disruption or restriction of the activities of the trade unions' coal office would mean nothing other than disrupting or restricting Denmark's coal supply, driving up coal prices, exposing the masses to suffering and illness from the cold, and undermining the activity of Danish industry.

The Danish workers will not do this. The campaign orchestrated by the newspaper "Köbenhavn" and then transformed into electioneering will have an effect contrary to that intended by the instigators of this agitation: it will not diminish, but increase, the confidence of the working masses in the trade unions and in Social Democracy.

This is the story of the Danish Trade Unions' Coal Office. I do not deny that, insofar as I was involved in this business, I had the very pleasant thought that I would thereby be doing a service to the Danish people and especially to the Danish workers. If this can be seen as an offense for which I should be expelled from Denmark, as demanded by the newspaper "Köbenhavn," then let me be expelled. I have made no political demands on anyone, in connection with or without connection to the coal business, and have not entered into any agreements with anyone.

I do not own shares in the Coal Office. To prevent any misunderstandings, I would like to add that I personally do not own any shares in the Coal Office, nor do I receive any income from it

Such behavior might seem strange to those who believe that anyone who has entered into trade must grab hold of everything. This is possible, but by no means obligatory. I am a businessman, an industrialist, a capitalist, but even in purely commercial ventures, besides the profit, and often more so than the profit, the organizational, business side was of paramount importance to me. To avoid making unfounded claims, I would like to cite as an example the "Freight and Transport Company" I founded in Copenhagen, which has also been mentioned in the newspapers. The company fulfilled its task of maintaining a regular coal transport service during the war. Anyone with even a passing familiarity with freight will admit that this was a complicated matter. And on top of that, our company secured an unprecedented discount on sea freight rates, which, incidentally, the Danish State Railways also took advantage of.

I could name a whole series of ventures in which I have applied new ideas in one form or another. But all this is of little importance. I have no intention of justifying capitalist profit through personal qualities. But I do not see why I should not be able to appropriate a portion of the surplus value accumulated by the capitalist class

My wealth, the dimensions of which have been grossly exaggerated by gossip and rumor, does not burden me in any way. It has merely given me the opportunity to expand my social activities. This also includes the "Society for the Study of the Social Consequences of War," which I founded and about which a considerable amount has been written in the newspapers. The aforementioned society has established a library in Copenhagen, which is accessible to everyone who wishes to engage in scholarly work. Its scholarly work has earned it an international reputation; it is cited by authoritative journals in all belligerent countries, in England, Russia, Germany, Austria, and so on. However, all this has not deterred the scribblers from suspecting the aforementioned society simply because I am its founder, without any indication of what it is suspected of.

I already pointed out at the beginning that it is absolutely impossible to isolate all the individual facts of the defamation and insinuation and to orient oneself within them. Furthermore, the following has been done against me

There seems to be no end in sight to the lies and deception spread throughout the world. I would therefore like to cite only the most recent example that has come to my attention. In February of this year, the Parisian press, and subsequently the Danish, Swedish, and other newspapers, published a series of telegrams and other reports stating that money and various orders had been sent to well-known Russian revolutionaries. The complete text of these documents was published, including names, addresses, banks that were to disburse the money, etc. And all of this was completely fabricated from beginning to end, from the first word to the last! Not a shred of truth, not the slightest connection to the actual facts, but rather everything entirely and completely forged. Among these "documents" was one bearing my signature, which contained the following:

Herrn Moor, Stockholm.

To be delivered by Mr. S. Rauchwerg

We are sending the sum of 180,000 marks to your address, of which Engineer Steinberg must hand over 140,000 marks to Lenin during his trip to Finland. The remaining sum is at your disposal for organizing propaganda against England and France. We inform you that we have received the letters you sent from Maliniak and Steklow and are considering them.

I have never written anything of the sort to Moor or any other person, I don't know any Rauchwerg, I haven't sent Steinberg any money, I haven't handed over any sums to Lenin, I don't know Maliniak, and I don't correspond with either him or Steklow. All invented, all lies. And this is one example among many. Of course, it doesn't occur to me to run after every liar who might think of spreading nonsense about me. But what I have said is enough to open the public's eyes

It is of interest to compare how the campaign staged against me began and what it has led to. It began with the accusation that I was promoting German chauvinism and led to attacks that I was calling for the convening of an international socialist congress and was striving to bring the world closer to peace. It was initially waged against me personally and concluded with a general attack on German Social Democracy, the Russian Bolsheviks, and Danish Social Democracy; it began with accusations of imperialism against me and ended with the protection of the interests of the English coal magnates against the Danish workers. The slanderous campaign orchestrated against me has rendered itself absurd and thus its entire inner emptiness has come to light. Meanwhile, the slanderers were listened to, believed, encouraged, and even helped to achieve a certain degree of fame.

And yet, for more than 30 years I have participated in public life, and for more than a quarter of a century I have been active in literature. I should, one might think, be entitled to demand that I be judged by my own views and that no base motives be attributed to me. My life's path is marked by my literary works as by milestones: one can determine from them, year by year, what constituted the focus of my intellectual activity, what filled my life at that particular time.

I have worked no small amount, and pondered even more. If I address myself especially to my party opponents and to my forgetful friends, everything I have written, regardless of whether I was right or wrong, you will find in it all a fervent, unconquerable desire to get to the root of the truth. In the realm of thought, I know no compromises. With me, everything is subject to criticism, including revolution and socialism, the concepts of good and evil, of

justice, of morality. My person cannot be separated from my writings. My personal life has been a continuous experiment: I searched for the key to human passions and impulses and mercilessly destroyed all illusions. There is nothing I would not be resolved to do if I believe it to be right, and there is nothing that could hold me back if it contradicts my convictions

For I am what you, who are revolutionaries by feeling, by program, by hearsay, by tradition, by accidental circumstances, understand least: I am a revolutionary of thought. My thought is incorruptible.

Can you say the same about yourselves? I'm not talking about money; that's the crudest form of temptation, one that even poor people can resist. There are other, more subtle, even noble forms. How often can one achieve honor, fame, influence by bending the truth just a little, by conforming just a little to the milieu, to the general level of human folly? Success is captivating, especially literary or political success. It's so pleasant to feel embraced by general sympathy that even strong people involuntarily make concessions so as not to be left out of the mainstream. Those who swim against the current are captivated by the awareness of their heroic isolation—however much the current may change direction, they won't believe it; they will fight against it because their thoughts aren't courageous or free enough to rise above their accustomed circumstances. Tradition, the martyr's crown, one's own past are all compelling. The more sacrifices one has made for an idea, the more strongly it has been received, the harder it is to let go of it, and the mind involuntarily resorts to sophisms to avoid seeing its falseness when it is exposed. Consequently, revolutionaries are usually people of a conservative mindset: once they have adopted a revolutionary position, they lock it away in their heads, as if behind blocks of stone, from the general movement of ideas. Compassion for the masses, love of humanity, are all compelling: it is hard to let go of illusions when these are linked to the idea of making humanity happy.

Who among you has not flattered the masses to gain their trust? In my eyes, that is tantamount to cheating a beggar.

The cultural progress of humanity requires ruthless and merciless intellectual work. This is the area where I am always ready to meet you. Here you can show what you are worth.

Looking back at the petty things that tingled deep down and tried to throw dirt at me, I felt that entire layers of culture lay between me and this audience. By attributing base motives to me, they revealed the base meaning that animated themselves. This intellectual rabble, this filth of the street!

Renegades of thought, and dragging their tattered socialist coats behind them to conceal their intellectual nakedness. Journalistic trifles, junk, water spiders that flit about on the surface of public opinion, insolent spongers who sniff around everything and have even penetrated the anteroom of scientific socialism, but haven't made it beyond it, bunglers whose intellectual toils I have occasionally described as the lackeys' quarters of socialism and the socialism of the lackeys' quarters.

Middle-of-the-road things, outcasts of civilization, rabble of thought, rags! The best of them are incapable of rising above everyday life except on a rope stretched by others. When there are several of them, they form a mob; they don't become any wiser for it, but they do become more brazen.

Their virtue is dressed up like a rich shopkeeper's wife and pushy like a beggar. It lasts only as long as it feels watched by a stranger's eye; left to its own devices, it bursts like a bubble, and filth and nothingness pour out of it.

To characterize them is to deal with them. They scurry like moles, bite each other, fill the atmosphere with their putrid breath. A hideous spectacle of human depravity. It is best not to linger on it. "Pass on," as Dante says.

I go on my way, to new, old tasks.

Postscript: The Bolshevik Peace

The Bolsheviks bear full responsibility for the peace concluded by Russia. Russia could have had far more favorable peace terms if the Bolsheviks' senseless and quarrelsome tactics had not intervened. Lenin himself proved to be wiser this time than his views suggest; Trotsky assumed the role of the fool. However, there is no doubt that the tactics employed by the latter during the peace negotiations were pure Bolshevism, or, which amounts to the same thing, pure Leninism.

As a brilliant orator and incisive polemicist, Trotsky initially gives the impression of great independence. Left to his own devices, he repeats, in endless variations, what has already been said. But when he has seized upon a foreign idea, he infuses its development with the same richness of form. His conditional independence resembles the movement of a top, which spins, hums, and jumps from place to place only because it is occasionally whipped into motion by another hand.

Bolshevism rules Russia. Bolshevism, embodied in state policy, is so narrow-minded that Lenin, its very originator, seeks a way out through compromise!

The tactics that Trotsky and I followed in the First Soviet of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg in 1905 differ significantly from the current tactics of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Soviet at that time subordinated itself to both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, as well as all other socialist factions. Its primary aim was to achieve class unity of the proletariat. It kept its distance from other democratic organizations, but was not hostile to them; rather, it sought to subordinate their activities to its influence. Among its political demands was the convening of a Constituent Assembly. The current Soviets are terrorizing not only the reactionaries and capitalists, but also the democratic bourgeoisie and even all socialist workers' organizations that do not agree with them. They have dispersed the Constituent Assembly and, having lost their moral authority, now hold sway over the "masses" with the help of machine guns. The essence of Bolshevism is simple: to unleash revolution everywhere, at any time, without any reference to the political situation or to any other Historical facts.

Whoever opposes this is an enemy, and there is no other course of action towards enemies than complete and immediate annihilation. Enemies are the bourgeois governments; the propertied classes are considered enemies; democratic parties are also enemies, since they seek to reconcile the masses with the existing order; socialist parties are also enemies, insofar as they do not agree to go all in immediately; trade unions are also enemies, since by improving the situation of the workers, they diminish their revolutionary sentiment and mood. The highest thing with which Bolshevism ever agreed was trade unions, under its leadership, as the school and breeding ground of revolution… But towards all those who are against Bolshevism or disagree with it, Bolshevism has only one slogan: to crush them immediately.

These views are not new The social democracies of all countries had to reckon with them within their own ranks, and I personally had ample opportunity to write about them. I revealed at the time that the unreflective revolutionary is, in spirit, a close relative of reckless opportunism. Both become bewildered by the complex tangle of industrial, state, national, cultural, class, and global relations of capitalism and seek to simplify their task: the former by grasping capitalism in its general terms, the latter by concentrating their attention on the objects closest to their narrow horizons. This is just as if some based their geographical knowledge on the fact that the earth is a sphere and revolves around the sun, while others based it on an examination of the nearest dung heap. The former go for the big picture, the latter sidestep it; both lack a clear direction. Consequently, such revolutionaries easily turn into opportunists and vice versa. The number of such individual cases is not small.

Further examples will soon be provided by the Russian Bolsheviks. On Russian soil, unbridled revolutionaryism has taken on its wildest form. The inadequate experience of the workers' movement, the inadequate development of capitalism itself and the bourgeois order, the unfamiliarity with democratic forms, and finally the intolerance of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, which, although it fought against Tsarism, was nevertheless educated under Tsarism and consequently cannot help but command, all played a role here. If Marxism represents a reflection of the social history of Western Europe, refracted through the prism of German philosophy, then Bolshevism is Marxism, simplified by ignoramuses and refracted through the prism of Russian narrow-mindedness.

The reader knows that between me and the Bolsheviks, although they also advocated the military defeat of Russia, there was a difference of opinion. I took into account the effective factors—economic, political, military—I took into account the interplay of forces, the possible results. For the Bolsheviks, however, there was always a ready-made answer to this, this, and everything else: revolution. They were warned sufficiently and shown the true state of affairs.

I met with Lenin in Switzerland in the summer of 1915. I presented my views to him on the social-revolutionary consequences of the war and at the same time pointed out that as long as the war lasted, there would be no revolution in Germany, that a revolution was only possible in Russia at that time, and that it would erupt there as a result of the German victories. But he dreamed of publishing a communist journal, with which he believed he

could immediately drive the European proletariat out of the trenches and into the revolution.

The war continued to unfold, destroying national borders and shattering social structures. Lenin sat in Switzerland and wrote articles that almost never reached beyond émigré circles. He was completely cut off from Russia, grafted in like a bottle. The same was true for Trotsky in Paris and for the entire Russian émigré community. Trotsky did, however, give the nervous French government a bit of a scare, but he didn't set the sea ablaze. If revolutionary agitation was carried out in Russia, it was done by people on the ground.

But even the influence of this agitation cannot, of course, be compared in the slightest to the revolutionary effect of the destruction of the Russian army. When the revolution broke out, German Social Democracy naturally did everything it could to help the Russian émigrés get to Russia. I was in Stockholm when Lenin was passing through. He refused a personal meeting. I had a mutual friend tell him: what was needed above all now was peace, consequently peace terms were necessary, what did he intend to do? Lenin replied: he did not concern himself with diplomacy, his business was social-revolutionary agitation. To this I replied: "Tell Lenin to just agitate; but if state policy doesn't exist for him, then he will become a tool in my hands."

In my view, it was above all necessary to convene an International Socialist Congress. The authority of the Russian Revolution was immense at that time. There was a longing for peace throughout Europe. Under such circumstances, a socialist congress would probably have been able to dictate peace to the governments. It would have played a twofold historical role. Firstly, it would have brought an end to the war; secondly, it would have consolidated the political influence of the working class for the future.

The congress was brought down by the Entente imperialists. However, it must be pointed out that it was boycotted by the Bolsheviks at that time. Had this boycott not intervened, it would probably not have been possible to bring down the congress.

The Bolsheviks did not want to establish relations with the official socialist parties because the latter were not revolutionary enough for them. They negotiated only with the Zimmerwalds, i.e., with a handful of people who had no political significance whatsoever.

Instead of uniting the socialist parties and opposing them to the imperialist governments, the Bolsheviks sought to divide them. They believed that in order to bring about a revolution in Western Europe, Bolshevism had to be cultivated there above all. The result of this foolish tactic was that the Entente imperialists all the more easily subjugated the foreign policy of the Russian Provisional Government, and the war continued.

At the First Congress of Soviets, Lenin thundered against the imperialist policies of the Provisional Government, but at the same time, he threatened the Central Powers with "revolutionary war." The Bolsheviks declared themselves opponents of a separate peace and demanded that the principle of national self-determination be applied "not only to Russian Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and Armenia, but also to Bohemia, Croatia, and Posen."

The Kerensky government repeated the error of the Tsarist government by assuming that military superiority lay with the Entente powers, while the Bolsheviks completely underestimated the war situation, believing that they could disorganize the imperialist armies with the help of the revolution.

Both Kerensky and the Bolsheviks simultaneously lived under the illusion that in Russia itself, revolutionary enthusiasm was capable of replacing military leadership, military training, and even the lack of means of communication.

The revolution covers everything and is created by Bolshevism!

Meanwhile, the German armies, provoked into battle by Kerensky's offensive, defeated the Russian army, thereby securing another victory for the army and preparing the ground for Bolshevism in Russia.

The masses understood what the Russian intelligentsia still could not grasp: that they had to give in militarily, that they could not continue the war. The Russian armies scattered.

If not democratic sentiment, then demagogic instinct instilled in the Bolsheviks the idea that it was now necessary to make peace the starting point of their agitation

They were brave enough to put the question of peace on the edge and to break the old chains that subordinated Russian state policy to the English imperialists.

They did not continue down this path. On the contrary, they soon began to retreat.

By deciding to conclude a separate peace, they were ostensibly exerting pressure on all belligerent parties, especially the Entente powers, in favor of a general peace. In order to further exploit this situation, the question of an International Socialist Congress naturally resurfaced. The Bolsheviks, however, wanted nothing to do with it.

Even more important, in the interest of a separate peace favorable to Russia and to democracy, was to initiate joint action with the socialist parties of the Central Powers, especially with the German Social Democrats.

Hardly had the German Social Democrats, at my initiative, sent greetings to the Bolsheviks when they came to power. From my conversations with the Bolsheviks in Stockholm, I gained the conviction that it was entirely possible to harmonize our respective actions. This, however, did not last long. Radeck, who had participated in our discussions, had arrived in St. Petersburg when he changed his views so drastically that he could no longer bring himself to honestly reproduce the opinions he himself had expressed, and in his report, he unscrupulously falsified the content of our conversation.

Both Scheidemann and I explained to the Bolsheviks with all authority that a revolution in Germany was impossible as long as the war continued, and that, moreover, it was inadmissible to demand that we endanger the Western Front. We would not do this because the victory of the Entente would be the end not only for Germany but also for the Russian Revolution. Peace was essential above all to unleash the revolutionary forces of the proletariat. And to achieve a democratic peace, a united front of the socialist parties of the negotiating countries was essential above all.

We pointed to the agitation that German Social Democracy had undertaken for a peace without annexations and indemnities, and further to the fact that it had succeeded in securing the majority of the Reich for this resolution

to group themselves, and that this majority had forced the government to adopt the same position on the question of peace negotiations. We made no secret of the fact that in Germany, as in all other countries and also in Russia, there are chauvinistic currents, and to

combat these, it is particularly important that an agreement be reached precisely between the socialist parties of the hostile countries.

The socialist parties would, of course, be able to reach an understanding among themselves far more easily than the official diplomats. One could hardly doubt that if a congress of socialist representatives of the negotiating states were to convene at the same time as the official peace negotiations, the work of this congress would exert a strong pressure on public opinion in favor of a democratic peace.

The Bolsheviks, however, preferred to conduct the peace negotiations entirely on their own with the official diplomats, thereby playing into the hands of the German reactionaries, who most feared Social Democratic intervention in the peace negotiations.

The Bolsheviks wanted us to support them through a revolution, but they themselves refused to support us in the parliamentary struggle for a democratic peace. The result was that they weakened their own position.

Instead of using the authority, organization, parliamentary representation, press, and other powerful agitational tools of German Social Democracy in the struggle for a democratic peace, the Bolsheviks decided to incite a revolution in Germany by distributing inflammatory leaflets on the German front. They became so carried away by this idea that they pushed the question of peace into the background. They also conducted the peace negotiations from this standpoint: it was less important to them to achieve positive results than to create agitational material. The news they had received about the ferment among the working masses in Austria and Germany spurred them on even more to take this path. German Social Democracy, both in parliament and in the press, responded to the growing discontent to group themselves, and that this majority had forced the government to adopt the same position on the question of peace negotiations. We made no secret of the fact that in Germany, as in all other countries and also in Russia, there are chauvinistic currents, and to combat these, it is particularly important that an agreement be reached precisely between the socialist parties of the hostile countries.

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Russia was shattered, and the peace terms were changed.

With their revolutionary tactics, the Bolsheviks overturned the terms of the democratic peace, which had been prepared by the rational and persistent political work of German Social Democracy.

The basis on which the peace negotiations were conducted was a democratic one. Germany renounced all contributions and annexations; it recognized the independence of the territories it occupied. A disagreement arose only on the question of when the evacuation of the occupied territories should take place, as well as on the question of the borders of the right of individual nationalities to self-determination. The German delegation did not want to allow the territories separated from Russia to rejoin it, even voluntarily She believed that the expansion of Russian state power achieved in this way would have been a

danger to the state and national interests of the German people, and saw in it a legal limit to the self-determination of the nationalities in the occupied territories. The Russian opinion, however, was that the self-determination of individual nationalities had no limits whatsoever. German Social Democracy did not share this view, but when it came to granting the individual territories the greatest possible autonomy and democratic forms of government, it supported the Russian position.

The German government, as is well known, is by no means socialist; German Social Democracy does not make government policy, it can only exert influence on it through external pressure; the Bolsheviks, however, although they held state power in Russia, possessed no armament that they could oppose to the German one, consequently, a result in matters requiring immediate resolution could only be achieved through compromise. A compromise would certainly be possible. It must not be forgotten that Germany has a strong economic and political interest in maintaining friendly relations with Russia. For the German delegation, a strategic, rather than annexationist, standpoint was decisive: they wanted to secure East

Prussia was protected from the possibility of a Russian invasion by creating buffer states between Prussia and Russia. The Russian delegation did not present any state interests at all; rather, it claimed that it was protecting not the interests of Russia, but the interests of the nationalities in the occupied territories. Russia could therefore, on its own initiative, renounce unification with these territories and demand substantial guarantees for their democratic development. I do not want to claim that the question was resolved precisely in this way; other, more favorable combinations could have been agreed upon. But for the Bolsheviks, no other methods of struggle existed besides the revolutionary ones, nor was there any other solution to the question than the motto: All or nothing!

However, as soon as it became clear in Germany that a negotiated peace with the Bolsheviks was impossible, the position of German Social Democracy was thereby discredited. The annexationists and the military party gained the upper hand, and peace was dictated to Russia

Thus, this time the Bolsheviks have given the German imperialists wind in their sails, just as they did previously with the English imperialists.

For this, they now rail all the more against German Social Democracy.

This railing serves not only to provide emotional relief but also to throw sand in people's eyes. In short, it serves to conceal the Bolsheviks' own tactics. Of course, it is good when people's leaders become wise through experience; unfortunately, however, according to the law of political consequences, to which I have referred above, one must fear that the narrow-minded revolutionaryism of the Bolsheviks, having encountered an insurmountable obstacle, will be transformed into opportunism

The transition to this is created by revolutionary chauvinism, of which Trotsky is currently acting as sharpshooter. The buffoon Kerensky copied Napoleon, while the barker Trotsky copies Kerensky. I don't know who is whipping him into a frenzy now, the windbag Radek or some military figure who has managed to infiltrate Bolshevik circles, but his "path is clearly predetermined. After convincing himself that revolutionary enthusiasm alone could not create an army, he now set about creating a military organization. He will then convince himself that financial resources are necessary to create a military organization, and his further conviction will be that the maintenance of a modern, effective army requires a capitalist state economy with its system of loans, taxes, and the unrestrained exploitation of the masses.

By preparing to crush Germany with military force, the Bolsheviks are adopting the position of the Entente powers. They are thereby unmasking their Russian patriotism, which was hidden behind their revolutionary criticism of German Social Democracy.

Now, if it is permissible to rely on an army to protect the territory and semi-Asiatic culture of Russia—the rule of the Bolsheviks does not weaken this characteristic, but only strengthens it—why should German Social Democracy therefore renounce the protection of German territory and German culture? While they protect the right of self-determination of individual nationalities, the Bolsheviks refuse to grant this right to the German people and demand that they stab their own army in the back with a revolution, thereby exposing Germany to the danger of its destruction, simply to preserve the right of the Estonians to join Russia!

Some cloaked themselves in liberalism, others hid behind socialism, but all of them wanted to crush Germany, whether in the name of the right of peoples to self-determination, or in

the name of democracy, or in the name of revolution. Had they won, what language would they have spoken of, what theories would they have constructed to justify their demands, even the wildest ones! But precisely these furious, all-destructive tendencies of the imperialism of the Entente powers were one of the causes of their military crushing.

Germany was forced to win. In the course of the four years of war, peace could have been made more than once, but this possibility was always shattered by the unwavering desire of the Entente powers to destroy Germany, to tear her to pieces, to conquer Germany, to humiliate it, to reduce it to nothing. The question of who was to blame for the war will hardly ever be completely resolved. The diplomacy of those days gives the impression of people standing before an abyss, pushing each other and retreating. Undoubtedly, Serbia's acceptance of the Austrian ultimatum did not mitigate the diplomatic dispute between the great powers, but rather intensified it. Strict enforcement of this ultimatum would have shifted the balance of power in the Middle East.

After the Balkan Wars, the Entente powers were completely in control there, acting as if it were their own country. The subjugation of Serbia to Austria would have improved the chances of both Austria and Germany. Had the military clash between the two groups of great powers been postponed, it would not have been avoided. On the contrary, the conflict, suppressed at the last moment, would have only further ignited chauvinistic currents everywhere. Likewise, it is quite obvious that a postponement of the war would have benefited the Entente powers, who would have increased their armaments. They would have brought Turkey under their control very quickly and so completely that, in the event of war, Turkey would not have been able to escape it, and at the same time, they would probably have had Italy and Romania on their side right from the start of the war.

The German imperialists can always justify themselves with the argument: it is better to win a war of one's own making than to lose one without one's own making. In any case, peace with the Central Powers was out of the question.

Restoration of the status quo was possible even after the first months of the war, following the retreat from the Marne. However, the Entente powers were determined to utterly defeat the German army. Admittedly, the excitement at that time was still very high, and the Entente's war illusion was still too inflated, even though the war had already sufficiently demonstrated the sacrifices it entailed. But when the Russian armies were driven across the

Vistula and the military situation changed dramatically in Germany's favor, peace was nevertheless based on a restoration of the status quo.

But the Entente powers refused to consider peace; they armed themselves more and more, drew ever more countries into the war, and invented ever new ways to shatter the central states. Unable to break through the German front, they resorted to the diabolical tactic of forcing Germany to surrender by cutting off its food supplies. As worthy descendants of the lords who drove peasants from their ancestral lands to make way for sheep pastures, who drove millions of Irish people from their homeland through starvation, and who hunted the unemployed with dogs, the English imperialists forced their allies and, at the risk of their own destruction, England's vassals to participate in the Central Powers' food boycott, hoping that the suffering of women and children would force the German nation to relinquish its independence. But the more powerful and terrible the giant forces deployed against Germany, the greater the resistance of the German people, which increasingly shifted the military situation in their favor. Despite this, Germany was the first to offer peace and for a considerable time was prepared to conclude it on the basis of restoring the status quo ante bellum. What was the result? Germany's attempts to enter into peace negotiations were seen as a sign of weakness. Germany was mocked, and the days were counted until the bread ration would force its surrender. Ever larger masses were deployed against Germany. It was bombarded with iron and fire and forced to go into battle again and again. England, the ruler of the world, mobilized the entire world against Germany and forced Germany to conquer the entire world. The Bolsheviks' war plans are not only senseless in and of themselves, but also because they come at a moment when everything has already been settled.

At the beginning of the war, one had to reckon with its probable course, but now all that remains is to consider the result of the war.

The victory of Germany and its allies can no longer be thwarted. The agony of the Entente. The war can still demand terrible sacrifices from both sides, but its continuation can only change its outcome in Germany's favor. Whether that is good or bad, how one should react to it, is irrelevant; the element of the desirable has been extinguished by the fait accompli. If it was not possible to break through the German Western Front when the Allied armies were still holding off the Russian masses along the entire immense expanse of the eastern borders

and the Italian army stood on the heights of the Alps, then a breakthrough is even less likely now.

The Americans will no longer be able to help either. American aid was strongest when the United States supplied England and Russia with weapons and ammunition. American industry is more dangerous than the American armies. The American army cannot replace the Russian front. A large influx of American troops will only be a burden for the Entente powers, since they are already unable to feed their populations. The Americans would do better by sending bread and bacon instead of soldiers and ammunition. But even that won't help. For whatever one may think of the German submarine war, it is undeniable that the British have not succeeded in repelling it or even compensating for its effects to any significant degree, and that it is persistently and steadily undermining England's oceanic connections. In contrast, Germany's food supply must become ever better. Bread and other foodstuffs will be supplied to Germany from Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria, which has now taken Macedonia under cultivation. Austria-Hungary will probably also expand its arable land. Under these circumstances, one can be certain that if the Entente powers do not make peace voluntarily, peace will ultimately be dictated to them by Germany. The only question is whether the British or the Italian army will be destroyed first. That is the situation, which Trotsky's Armee will of course be unable to change.

This much is clear to everyone. To understand the rest, historical sense and a social-revolutionary standpoint is required. I will attempt to clarify some of the events unfolding, and I look forward in advance to perhaps giving new impetus to the waning eloquence of Trotsky, whose agitational skills I have always held in high esteem, just as I have always taken pleasure in the play of his thoughts, in his ability to give the literary spectrum of an idea, to dissect white light into its constituent parts.

Germany, through a exertion of force that surpasses all imagination and that stirred all the nation's forces to their very core, has defeated the entire world mobilized against the Reich. Can the European states now, therefore, set themselves the task of surpassing Germany militarily, a country that has already surpassed the entire world? Is it possible to continue military armaments on the enormous basis created by the present war? I maintain that even on the basis that existed before the war, it cannot be continued, because the war has exhausted the strength of the nations. Given these circumstances, Europe's task cannot be to arm itself against Germany, but rather to unite with it! I will be told that in this

unification, Germany will have military supremacy. Yes, of course, but why shouldn't it? I know that with such a question I will touch on frayed nerves and provoke a storm of protests, accusations of German imperialism, and so on. But I am not writing this, not to pander to the tastes of one audience or another, not to flatter passions, not to make concessions to ignorance.

At the beginning of the war, for reasons known to the reader, I advocated for the victory of the Central Powers and called for their support from the socialist parties of the entire world. I rejected the national standpoint that held that every nation, in the struggle for its self-determination, has the right to destroy all other nations. My position on the war was determined by the general assessment of its consequences for the political and social development of Europe and the entire civilized world. Consequently, I called for joint actions in one direction. It was argued that supporting the Central Powers would have led to a triumph of Prussian militarism. However, what is the reality? Let us imagine, for example, that Italy, instead of betraying the Triple Alliance, had gone along with it from the outset! Now that the entire course of the war has unfolded before us, we can say with certainty that under these circumstances the war would have ended long ago with the victory of the Triple Alliance, but that Germany's role in this war would not have been nearly as brilliant as it is now. The war would have been shorter, and at the same time the triumph of Prussian militarism would have been less pronounced.

At present, this is not a political stipulation, but a political fact that cannot be ignored. The unification of Europe must proceed on the basis of the existing interrelationship between the powers of the states. Anyone who makes a change in this interrelationship a precondition for unification is substituting a utopia for reality.

It suffices to glance at the map of Europe to be convinced that it would be much easier for Germany to protect a Europe it has disarmed than to defend itself against an armed Europe. This is a significant fact. To go against Germany is to move towards its subjugation; to go along with Germany means to subordinate it to oneself and to others

The unification of Germany, which democracy sought to bring about through revolutionary means, was achieved by military means, with Austria being sidelined by Prussia, which

placed itself within the framework of the German Reich. In fact, Prussia's historical role was over at that moment.

If the present war were to become the precondition for the unification of Europe, which the socialist parties sought to bring about through revolutionary means, then Germany's entry into the sphere of a united Europe will eradicate the last specific features of Prussian militarism.

The best weapon against militarism is the establishment of a living connection between the

Nationalities. The destruction of militarism is not a prerequisite, but a result of democracy.

The war is nearing its end, and with peace, the factors of progress move to the forefront of history.

But we have become accustomed to war as we once were to peace, and created in this way, it leaves a bloody mark on the entire development of humankind. In reality, after the current war, an even longer era of peace must ensue in Europe than the one before the war. Perhaps it is the last European war.

This is why the peace terms that are now to be agreed upon will remain in effect for a long time. This is why it is important in the interest of democracy not to push the war to its ultimate extreme, but to bring about a negotiated peace

only through the realization that the power of imperialist governments is maintained through war. Once the war is over, once the masses have returned home, it will be difficult to drive them back into the trenches to murder and be murdered. At least for two generations, European peace is secured. All the interest of public opinion, politics, science, and literature will concentrate on an analysis of what has been experienced and on the consequences of the great war.

The war has brought about an economic revolution such as the world has never seen. It has destroyed the middle class, it has created enormous concentrations of capital, and at the same time filled the working masses with the awareness that the armies are holding them, that they constitute the main state power of the country. The war has simultaneously placed

enormous economic and social expenditures on the agenda, without which the further development of industry is impossible

I foresee not an uninterrupted series of wars, but a cultural upswing in the next Europe. A new cultural development in Europe.

However, this is hindered by the fragmentation of intellectual life and the national bitterness that the war has fostered. This intellectual reflex, however, is being addressed by the

For a more detailed orientation regarding these connections, I refer to my book "The State, Industry, and Socialism"; regarding questions of proletarian politics, I refer to my other work: "The Class Struggle of the Proletariat." Both books present the development and scientific justification of the tactics I followed when I participated in the activities of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Russian Social Democratic Party.

The convocation of the Constituent Assembly is absolutely necessary. However, the workers will be in the minority in it, as in the subsequent parliamentary assemblies of Russia. Nevertheless, through their organization and their political consciousness, they will be able to play a prominent, even leading, role in it. The revolutionary dictatorship also has its limits. It will not be possible for the workers' government to maintain its power forever with the help of machine guns. Consequently, it is better to enter into a compromise in good time and secure the greatest possible influence for the organizations of the proletariat, rather than waiting for the moment when the peasant masses, in conjunction with the social mishmash of the current Soviets, will first sideline the politics of the proletariat and then the organization of the

proletariat. A close connection with the socialist and trade unionist labor organizations of other countries, and especially with German Social Democracy, is absolutely necessary

The Russian socialist movement was the ideological protégé of German social democracy, with the Russian intelligentsia playing the mediating role. That was before the war and before the revolution. Now that the working masses in Russia have come to the fore, a connection on an incomparably broader basis, a political and social cooperation between

the working masses in Russia and Germany, is possible, the social and revolutionary consequences of which are entirely unforeseeable.

This could be severely hampered by the development of chauvinism in Russia, whereas, on the contrary, the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and Russia would promote socialist rapprochement. However, should excessive patriotism gain the upper hand in Russia, and should anti-Germanism take hold,

cultural forces of peacetime are pushed aside and ultimately completely obscured. The interim period of the struggle between the two currents is the one in which the conscious activity of individuals, persons, and parties could render the greatest service to humankind. The atmosphere of lies and hatred must be dispelled. Sophisms, such as the claim that the German nation must be boycotted because the Junker class still holds political sway in Germany, must be rejected. The form of government must not stand in the way of a League of Nations, if such a thing is possible. Even less must the fighting proletariat allow itself to be misled by such arguments.

For the further development of Russia on the path to socialism, it is above all necessary that workers' democracy in Russia emerge from the state of isolation, both internally and externally, into which it has been driven by Bolshevism. At the same time, the class organizations of the proletariat must be consolidated and developed

The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are a mixed organization of a temporary revolutionary nature. They resemble a Jewish Kahal far more than a modern democracy. Brought to the surface by the revolution, they initially follow the revolutionary leaders, but if they become a permanent institution, their social and cultural character must emerge, which is nothing other than a mixture of all strata of poverty. The proletariat must unite as a class, separate from the others. The best, historically developed forms for this are: the trade unions and social democracy modeled on the German example. Once organized as a class, the proletariat will always understand how to exert the greatest possible influence on the further social development of Russia. In this, the proletariat must not forget that Russia is primarily faced with the question of industrial development. The Bolsheviks' endeavor to build socialism on the basis of a rudimentary industry led to the sanctioning of widespread plunder On the other hand, concern for industrial development by no means demands that

it be left unchecked to capitalist plunderers. The main factor in the development of modern industry is the state and municipal budget. I refer to

Should this develop, it would be disastrous for Russia itself. For it would then have to submit to England and France once again, and this would primarily mean the restoration of Russia's national debt. In other words, the allies would impose an enormous contribution on Russia. Even now, under the capitalist system, Germany and Russia complement each other excellently in their economic development. The reader knows my opinion: if the Bolsheviks' senseless schemes hadn't intervened, the peace negotiations would have led to an understanding. But even now, all is not lost! The independence of the territories separated from Russia is recognized and can be guaranteed, and with regard to democratic development, one could be all the more confident the greater the democratization of Germany itself. To this end, it is above all necessary to pit the factors and interests that unite the nationalities and promote world industry and world culture against the factors that isolate and disorganize the nations; above all, a unity and cooperation of the socialist workers' parties is necessary. I repeat the words with which I concluded my pamphlet on the social balance sheet of the war more than a year ago —

He concluded: "Europe, on which modern civilization is based, must unite for peaceful cooperation in labor and science. War ends with the bankruptcy of nationalism and imperialism. It opens the way to socialism."

Stockholm, April 1918.

Parvus